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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in Garvin v. Garvin.2" The Garvin case was clear authority for
the issuance of the injunction in Hammer v. Hammer, and was
cited as such. It would appear that at least this portion of the
New York law of divorce is now well settled.
Choice of Court
An employee of a large organization may find himself working
at different times in different States. He may remain outside of
his State of domicile or of employment for varying periods. When
such an employee is injured on the job, what forum is to handle
any claim which he might have against his employer? Such a
problem was presented in Cradduck v. Hallen Co."0
Plaintiff, a resident of Pennsylvania, was employed as an apprentice steel-worker by a New York corporation. He was sent to
Indiana, to remain there until the completion of a particular construction job. Sustaining personal injury, he sought workmen 's
compensation in New York, where an award was made and sustained on appeal to the Appellate Division."0 The Court of Appeals, in disallowing the award, held that the New York Workmen's Compensation Board had no jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that such employment outside the State was not transitory
or temporary but was at a fix6d place; therefore, New York had
but a remote concern with it. 3"

In this State, the solution to the above question is thus presented by a characterization of the work itself. The Court of
Appeals has consistently withheld the State's facilities where the
employment is, in any sense, "stationary' ' 2 -disfinguishing this
type of work from that done by salesmen, and others similarly
situated.3
Choice of Law
In conflict of laws, the "choice- of law" contemplates the problems inherent in the determination of the particular local law
applicable in a specific case. For example, when a testator de28: 302.N. Y. 96, 96 N. E. 2d 721 (1951).
29. 304 N. Y. 240, 107 N. E. 2d 11 (1952).
30. 279 App. Div. 679, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 874 (3rd Dep't 1951).
31. Matter of Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930).
32. Matter of Roth v. A. C. Horn Co., 287 N. Y. 545, 38 N. E. 2d 221 (1941).
33. Mdtter-of Amaxis v. N. A. Vassilaros, Inc., 258 N. Y. 544, 180 N. E. 325
(1931) ; Matter of Zeltoski v. Osborne Drilling Corp., 264 N. Y. 496, 191 N. E. 532

(1934).
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vises realty situated in more than one State, several questions are
immediately raised.
The law of which jurisdiction will:
(1) determine whether an equitable conversion has taken
place, and if so, its effect in the conflicts situation?
(2) ,regulate the construction of the will, including the testator's intent?
Further, does the determination of either, or both, of the previous questions by forum one estop forum two from making an
independent investigation?
The case of In re Good's Til134 presented all of these problems to the Court of Appeals. In 1913, the testator executed his
will in the State of his domicile, New Jersey. In it he created
three separate trusts providing for the payment, to specified persons, of the income from realty situated in New Jersey, Colorado,
and New York. (Under the terms of the will, the trustees were
given a discretionary power of sale over the property. No particular State law was specified as controlling. 35)

The testator's

daughter was named as life beneficiary in one of the trusts, which
also provided a substitutional gift to "the surviving issue of my
said daughter" in the event that she predeceased either the testator or his wife. Testator died, and the will was admitted to probate in New Jersey in 1915. The testamentary trusts having terminated, a.construction of the will became necessary to determine
who was entitled to share in the remainder created in the daughter's trust provision, i. e., whether the word "issue" evinced an
intent to pass the property per stirpes or per capita.
The Chancery Court of New Jersey 6 ruled that there had been
an equitable conversion of the realty; and that the property passed

per stirpes. On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court 37 reversed

the Vice-Clhancellor's construction, ruling that the property was
54. 304 N. Y. 110, 106 N. E. 2d 36 (1952).
35. Had the testator made. it clear that the will was to be interpreted according
to thd laws of a specified jurisdiction, such intent would usually be effectuated by the
Ne'w York courts. In re Kadjar's Estate;200 Misc. 268, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 113 (Surr. Ct.
(1950); In re Adriance's Estate, 158 Misc. 857, 286 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
36. H6yt et al. v. Orcutt ef at., 59 A. 2d 17 (1948). Under the applicable New
Jersey. law, the word "issue" alone raised a per capita presumption, unless a contrary
intent- clearly appeared. The .Vice-Chancellor found such a clearly-expressed contrary
intent.
37. Hoyt et al. v. Orcutiet at., 1 N. 3. 454, 64 A. 2d 212 (1949).
Court was unable to find the requisite intent.

The Supreme
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to pass -percapita. Both courts expressly excluded from their de-

termination all of the property located without the State. 8
However, in construing the will as to the New York property
involved, the Surrogate held that there was no equitable conversion inasmuch as there was a discretionary power of sale in the
trustees; and that the realty passed per stirpes. Both the Appellate Division 40 and the .Court of Appeals sustained this determination.
The Court of Appeals presented the following general rule
as the solution to all of the conflicts problems presented:
It is a principle firmly established that to the law of the
State in which the land is situated we must look for the rules
which govern its descent, alienation and transfer, and for the
effect and construction of wills and other conveyances.
New York thus possesses the power to determine whether or
not there has been an equitable conversion 42 as well as to construe
the will;43 nor will a previous determination of these questions by
a sister State remove this authority through estoppel by judgment." The question of greatest importance in the instant case
goes one step farther, however. That is, although New York has
the power to determine the testator's intent, will it be ascertained
by the laws of the situs of the realty or the law of the testator 's
domicile at the time of the will's execution?
According to Prof. Beale, 45 there is a clear distinction between
the effect of language used in a will" (construction) and the mean38. See generally, Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 123 X. J.Eq. 556, 199
AtL 379 (1938).
39. In re Good's Estate, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 798 (Surr. Ct. 1950). Since the testator
bad died before the enactment of DEc. EsT. LAw § 47-a (statutory presumption of per
stirpe.r), the common-law rule (codified into DEc. EsT. LAw §47) applied. This presumption, alike that of New Jersey,' was per capita, the difference being in that New
York held it-to be rebuttable by "a very faint glimpse of a contrary intenf'. ' Matter of
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168, 107 N. E. 340 (1914).
40. 278 App. Div. 806, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 804 (1st Dep't 1951).
41. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186, 191 (1900) ; 'and cases cited therein.
42. In re Chapman's Estate, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 26, 29 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; Fidelity
Union Trust Co.,v. Ackerman; supra n. 38; DEC. EsT. LAw, §47; REsTATEmNT.:CQNyumTro LAws .§241.
43. White et al. v. Howard et al., 46 N. Y. 144 (1871) ; Peck v. Cary, 27 N. Y.
9, 11 (1863). GooDRcH, CoNmr.cr or LAws; § 166 (3rd ed. 1949).
44. Montypeny v..Monypeny, 202 N. Y. 90, 95 N. E. 1 (1911); Putnam v. Lincolis
Safe Deposit Co., 191 N. Y. 166, 83 N. E. 789 (1908).
45. 2. BEALE, THE Co NICT oF LAws (1st ed. 1935)..
46. Id. § 251.3.
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ing of the words used in view of the circumstances of their use47

(interpretation). The former determines the quantity and quality
of the estates flowing from the testator's words. Definite rules of
property law are applied, and the testator's intent becomes immaterial. The lex loci rei sitae controls in this area. The interpretative process, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with establishing the intent of the testator from the words used in the instrument. The meaning of such words can best be judged in the
light of the law and usage controlling at the time and place of the
will's execution." Thus it would seem that the law of the testator's domicile should control in this area.49
In a situation such as existed in the Good case, the natural
presumptions would appear to be: first, that if the testator had
any law in mind at the time of the will's execution, it was the law
of his domicile; and, second, that he intended that all of his property was to pass in a uniform manner. However, the Court in the
instant case applied the law of the situs in interpreting the will.
If the results flowing from the above propositions are deemed desirable, the present decision is unfortunate in that it did violence
both to the testator's intent and to a uniform passage of his
property.
IV.

CoN

CTs

Appellate review frequently brings forth a change or modication of the existing body of law. The work of the Court of
Appeals in the area of contract law is without exception. Last
term witnessed the first direct holding in New York that parties
may effectively prohibit the assignment of contract rights. The
one-year section of the Statute of Frauds also received considerable attention with somewhat less fortunate results. Still other
'eases tended to clarify or restate existing law.
PreliminaryNegotiations
Frequently, parties plan to enter into a formal written agreement and have orally-decided upon all the terms to be incorporated
therein. The question is whether they have bound themselves
prior to the execution of the formal document. In Schwartz v.
47. Id. § 251.2.
48. Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12 N. E. 354 (1887).
49. RESTATMMNT, CoNxFIzcT OF LAWS § 251 (3):

The meaning of words used in a devise of land which, by the law of the state
where the land is . . . is, in the absence of controlling circumstances to the contrary.
determined in accordance with usage at the domicil of the testator at the time the will
was made.

